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R. v. Powley:
Building a Foundation for the
Constitutional Recognition of Métis
Aboriginal Rights
Lori Sterling and Peter Lemmond*

I. INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 1993, Steve and Roddy Powley shot a bull moose
just north of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. A week later, provincial conservation officers charged them for hunting moose without a licence and
possession of unlawfully hunted moose. In their defence, they asserted
that they are Métis1 and as such, have a constitutional Aboriginal right
to hunt for food. Almost fully 10 years later, on September 19, 2003, the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld their rights. This decision marked
both the end of a long legal process extending across four levels of
court, and the beginning of newly-recognized constitutional rights held
by Métis under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, it will sketch out the
essential elements of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v.
Powley.2 What is conspicuous about the Supreme Court of Canada’s
approach is how much it endeavours to follow the existing jurisprudence
dealing with First Nations. Next, the paper will highlight other possible
approaches to section 35 Métis Aboriginal rights that were before the
Court but were not referred to in its reasons. Finally, this paper will
*

Lori Sterling, Director, Crown Law Office — Civil; Peter Lemmond, Counsel,
Crown Law Office — Civil. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone
and do not represent the views of the Government of Ontario.
1
For the purposes of this article, “Métis” (capitalized) is used to refer to persons or
communities that hold Aboriginal rights as Métis under the Powley test.
2
2003 SCC 43, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43 [hereinafter “Powley”].
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canvas those parts of the test that are most likely to generate future litigation involving the Métis in Ontario.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE POWLEY DECISION
Given its landmark significance as the only final appellate court decision in any common law jurisdiction addressing constitutionallyentrenched Métis Aboriginal rights, the decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Powley is both concise and surprisingly devoid of academic or jurisprudential references. It is only 55 paragraphs long, applies only one decision and refers to only two others. As a result, this
decision might be described as a sound but circumscribed initial step in
the development of a test for Métis Aboriginal rights.
Reduced to essentials, Powley transposes the test for addressing Indian assertions of Aboriginal rights laid out in R. v. Van der Peet,3 to the
determination of Métis Aboriginal rights by modifying the timing requirement from a time prior to contact with Europeans to a time preceding the establishment of effective European control.4 Thus, while the
purpose of section 35 for First Nations is to give recognition of rights
held at the time of contact with Europeans, the purpose of the inclusion
of Métis is more open-ended. It is:
…based on a commitment to recognizing the Métis and enhancing their
survival as distinctive communities. The purpose and the promise of s. 35
is to protect practices that were historically important features of these
distinctive communities and that persist in the present day as integral
5
elements of their Métis culture. [Emphasis added.]

Similar to the test for establishing First Nation Aboriginal rights, the
establishment of Métis Aboriginal rights requires:
•

an accurate description of the alleged Aboriginal right;

•

establishment of a historic rights bearing Métis community at a
particular point in time which has continued into the modern day;
3
4
5

[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77 [hereinafter “Van der Peet”].
Powley, supra, note 2, at paras. 10, 14, 17-18 and 36-40.
Id., at para. 13.
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•

proof of a claimant’s membership in the contemporary Métis
community;

•

evidence that an Aboriginal practice was integral to the claimant’s distinctive historic community culture and has been carried
through to the modern day by the community;

•

no extinguishment of the right by treaty or other government
conduct; and

•

where the right was infringed, no justification of that infringement.

Applying the above approach, the Supreme Court in Powley concluded that “the right being claimed can…be characterized as the right
to hunt for food in the environs of Sault Ste. Marie”.6 Importantly, this
was not a case about commercial hunting or fishing. The evidence was
that the moose was for personal use.
After determining the nature of the Aboriginal right in issue, the
Supreme Court then turned its attention to identifying the historic and
contemporary rights bearing Métis community. Although this paper will
explore in Part III the meaning of “community” in more detail, suffice it
to note at this point that the Court held that “demographic evidence,
proof of shared customs, traditions, and a collective identity is required
to demonstrate the existence of a Métis community that can support a
claim to site-specific aboriginal rights”.7 In this case, both sides recognized that there had been a historic Métis community at Sault Ste. Marie
that had emerged by the early 19th century.
With respect to a modern day Métis community, the Court required
little evidence of its existence. Indeed, it held that the Sault Ste. Marie
Métis community’s lack of political or social visibility from the early
1900s onward did not mean that it did not continue to exist. The Court
was prepared to accept that the community existed continuously primarily on the basis of the presence of Métis organizations in the area and

6
7

Id., at para. 19.
Id., at para. 23.
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the fact that there were Métis families in the vicinity who had kinship
ties.
Turning to the issue of verifying the claimants’ membership in the
contemporary Sault Ste. Marie Métis community, the Court sought to
ensure that only Métis having ancestral connections to the historic Métis
community could lay claim to section 35 Aboriginal rights. It held that it
would look “to three broad factors as indicia of Métis identity for the
purpose of claiming Métis rights under s. 35: self-identification, ancestral connection and community acceptance”.8 Each of these criteria must
be met before membership can be established. The Court also noted that
evidence of longstanding identification and adoption of community
culture, customs and tradition are required to demonstrate membership.
In Powley, there was solid genealogical evidence that the Powleys descended directly from the Lesage family, one of the early Sault Ste.
Marie Métis families. It was therefore not necessary to discuss nonhereditary ways in which membership could be established.
Because the Powleys’ ancestors were members of the Batchewana
Band from the 1850s to around 1918 and received benefits under the
Robinson-Huron Treaty, the Supreme Court of Canada was called upon
to address the effect of this history on the Powleys’ ability to enjoy
Métis Aboriginal rights. The Court held that the “fact that the Powleys’
ancestors lived on an Indian reserve for a period of time does not negate
the Powleys’ Métis identity….[w]e emphasize that the individual decision by a Métis person’s ancestors to take treaty benefits does not necessarily extinguish that person’s claim to Métis rights. It will depend, in
part, on whether there was a collective adhesion by the Métis community to the treaty”.9 In this case, because there had been no collective
adhesion, it could not be said that the historic community had relinquished its rights.
This point has interesting potential consequences for First Nations.
For example, in the Sault Ste. Marie area there are First Nations members that have Métis origins. The Court left open the possibility that
these First Nation members may be able to assert Métis Aboriginal
rights in addition to or instead of treaty rights.

8
9

Id., at para. 30.
Id., at para. 35.
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The heart of the Powley decision is found in the discussion of the
relevant time frame for assessing when a Métis community must come
into existence before it can lay claim to section 35 rights. All parties
before the Court recognized that the point of contact test applicable to
First Nations would not provide for Aboriginal rights for the Métis as it
would not allow for the ethno-genesis of a Métis community. The question then became how far forward should the “clock” move to allow for
Métis community rights. At one extreme, it was suggested that the mere
existence of a modern day Métis community would suffice. At the other
extreme, it was suggested that section 35 was never intended to create
Métis Aboriginal rights and was limited to assertions of Métis treaty
rights. In the middle ground were two possible options for the time by
which the community must have existed: at the point of the assertion of
British sovereignty and the point of effective European control. The
Court chose the latter:
…the test for Métis practices should focus on identifying those practices,
customs and traditions that are integral to the Métis community’s
distinctive existence and relationship to the land. This unique history can
most appropriately be accommodated by a post contact but pre-control test
that identifies the time when Europeans effectively established political
and legal control in a particular area. The focus should be on the period
after a particular Métis community arose and before it came under the
effective control of European laws and customs. This pre-control test
enables us to identify those practices, customs and traditions that predate
the imposition of European laws and customs on the Métis.10 [Emphasis
added.]

With respect to the Sault Ste. Marie area, the Supreme Court found
the relevant date of effective European control to be approximately
1850. There was no dispute that the point of European assertion of sovereignty had been around 1763, prior to the emergence of a distinct
Sault Ste. Marie Métis community. As discussed in the following section of this paper, the legal test of assertion of sovereignty had been
referred to by members of the Court in earlier Aboriginal cases but it
was not mentioned by the Court in Powley. By 1850, however, there
was no dispute that a Métis community had formed in Sault Ste. Marie.
In fact, it was at its peak in terms of population and cultural develop10

Id., at para. 37.
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ment. Shortly after 1850, the community dispersed, with many members
moving onto the nearby reserves.
The Supreme Court also upheld the trial judge’s finding that hunting
for food was integral to the historic Métis way of life at Sault Ste. Marie
in the period just prior to 1850.11 This is an interesting finding since
moose were on the verge of extinction at that time. The Métis hunting
that did occur then involved mostly rabbits and other small animals.
Moose hunting did not start in earnest until much later, once the population had recovered. This aspect of the decision would appear to confirm
that subsistence harvesting activities are to be assessed in general rather
than specific terms (e.g., hunting or fishing generally rather than hunting
or fishing for particular species).12
Having concluded that the Powleys enjoy an Aboriginal right as
Métis to hunt for food, the Court found that Ontario’s regulatory scheme
infringed this right and that this infringement was not justified. The
Court concluded that there had been a blanket denial of a Métis right to
hunt for food that could not be justified.13

III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
MÉTIS RIGHTS NOT DISCUSSED BY THE COURT
As noted above, one of the central findings of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Powley is that the time frame relevant to identify Métis Aboriginal rights protected under section 35 is “the period after a particular
Métis community arose and before it came under the effective control of
European laws and custom”.14 Despite the critical importance of this
aspect of the Powley test, the Court provides little explanation of why,
as a matter of law, it is the appropriate measure of Métis Aboriginal
rights, and more particularly, why it is more appropriate than the assertion of sovereignty approach.
The Court explains the relevant time frame for identifying Métis
Aboriginal rights as being a necessary consequence of the purpose of
11

Id., at paras. 19-20, 41 and 43.
This approach may have ramifications for First Nations who have, at times, had their
activities assessed in more specific terms, e.g., herring spawn on kelp in R. v. Gladstone,
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 723.
13
Id., at paras. 47-50.
14
Id., at para. 37.
12

(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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section 35 as it pertains to the Métis, stating that “[t]he constitutionally
significant feature of the Métis is their special status as peoples that
emerged between first contact and the effective imposition of European
control”.15 It further found that:
Section 35 requires that we recognize and protect those customs and
traditions that were historically important features of Métis communities
prior to the time of effective European control, and that persist in the
present day. This modification is required to account for the unique postcontact emergence of Métis communities, and the post-contact foundation
of their aboriginal rights.16

Why it is that section 35 “requires” the recognition and protection of
the historically important features of Métis communities prior to the
time of effective European control is not clearly stated. Although the
Court’s conclusion is neither surprising (it had been recommended by
the respondent from trial) nor unreasonable (there was a reference to the
concept of the imposition of European laws and customs in McLachlin
J.’s dissenting reasons in Van der Peet),17 it is curious that such an important conclusion was reached without much in the way of an examination or explanation of its juridical foundations. The main problems with
the absence of any detailed discussion of the jurisprudential underpinning to the decision are that it could diminish the ability to predict how
unanswered questions will be resolved in the future and to ensure the
consistency that has informed much traditional common law judicial
reasoning.
Prior to this decision, the Court had moored the common law of
Aboriginal title to the assertion of British sovereignty. Thus, in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,18 the date of the assertion of British sovereignty was used for First Nations claims. This could easily have been
transposed to the context of Métis Aboriginal rights. As Ontario, Canada
and other governments argued at the Supreme Court of Canada in Powley, the assertion of sovereignty is also recognized in the wider body of
common law dealing with Aboriginal interests and the Supreme Court’s

15
16
17
18

Id., at para. 17.
Id., at para. 18.
Van der Peet, supra, note 3, at paras. 247-48.
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108.
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own decisions19 as being significant when ascertaining the Aboriginal
rights and title. Further, in R. v. Morin, the lower court had looked to the
assertion of sovereignty as the relevant time frame in recognizing a
Métis Aboriginal harvesting right.20
In the absence of express reasoning, it is left to inference to explain
why it is that the Supreme Court of Canada chose effective European
control as the relevant date for identifying Métis Aboriginal rights. One
possible rationale is that an underlying objective of section 35 is to
provide as wide as possible an opportunity for a Métis community to
come into existence and assert section 35 rights. Having accepted that
the inclusion of the Métis in section 35 must mean that Métis enjoy
protected Aboriginal rights, the Court appears to have wished to avoid
treating potential Métis communities in eastern and central Canada,
where the assertion of British sovereignty arguably occurred earlier,
differently than Métis communities further west, and adopted a test that
would attain this end.
On the facts of Powley itself, choosing the date of assertion of sovereignty may well have meant that there were no section 35 Métis community rights because the Sault Ste. Marie community likely did not
come into existence until after 1763, the date of assertion of sovereignty. In 1763, the Treaty of Paris ceded jurisdiction over an area including Sault Ste. Marie to the British Crown. In contrast, effective
control was held to be tied to the signing of treaties between the British
Crown and First Nations and large scale European immigration which
occurred much later, soon after 1850. By looking to effective control,
the Court was able to recognize the existence of section 35 Métis
Aboriginal rights in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie.
The consequence of this approach is that the Aboriginal rights of the
earliest Aboriginal peoples of Canada may encompass a considerably
narrower range of practices and may be significantly harder to establish
than those of the Métis. First Nation societies at the point of European
contact were far less likely to have engaged in activities reflecting a
19

Especially in Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue-M.N.R.), [2001] 1
S.C.R. 911, at paras. 10 and 62 (per McLachlin C.J.) and 114, 141-47, and 156-59 (per
Binnie J.), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33 and Delgamuukw, id., at paras. 143-48.
20
R. v. Morin and Daigneault, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 157, at 165, [1996] S.J. No. 262
(Prov. Ct.), affd (1997), 159 Sask. R. 161, at 165, [1997] S.J. No. 529 (Q.B.) [hereinafter
“Morin”].
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European influence, such as commercial trading, than when effective
control was ultimately established. For example, in the case of Sault Ste.
Marie, over 200 years separate the point of European contact from that
of effective control, during which time trading networks became more
extensive, sophisticated and commercial. Similarly, the oral evidence
and historical records from the time frame of when effective control was
established are far more voluminous than those available from the point
of European contact.
This then raises the question as to whether the point of contact test
itself will survive for First Nations. Will there be a perceived unfairness
if Métis Aboriginal rights are established at a time when commercial
activity was generally more prevalent among all Aboriginal peoples?
First Nations communities typically do not appear to have engaged in
the same kind of commerce at the time of contact. Certainly, the Métis
time frame of pre-control would have made a difference to the determination of the Sto:lo First Nation’s Aboriginal right to trade fish in the
Van der Peet case.
A second area the Supreme Court chose not to discuss was the approach taken to persons of mixed ancestry found in common law jurisprudence, particularly from other jurisdictions.21 With the submissions of the
parties and 17 intervenors, the Court had a rich vein of materials to draw
upon to sketch the jurisprudential foundations of its reasons. Much of that
material, however, demonstrated that persons of mixed ancestry were not
recognized as a distinct class of rights-holders holding distinct rights.
The Supreme Court’s reluctance in Powley to refer extensively to
existing jurisprudence is not typical of its past practice in landmark
Aboriginal rights cases. By way of example, in Van der Peet, which,
like Powley, articulated for the first time the legal principles that are to
be applied in identifying the Aboriginal rights held by a class of section
35 rights holders, Lamer C.J. (as he then was) considered many deci-

21

Ontario referred to 14 Canadian decisions, 16 imperial (United Kingdom) decisions,
15 Australian and New Zealand decisions, two United States decisions, three international
tribunal decisions, 23 Canadian statutes, two Canadian treaties, 15 United States treaties, six
journal articles, 10 legal texts, and numerous extracts from the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, although it is not clear how much of this was accepted as admissible by the Court. These materials reached back to the mid-16th century (Buckley v. Rice
Thomas (1554), 1 Plowden 118, 75 E.R. 182 (K.B.)) and provided a good overview of the
development of the law of Aboriginal rights.
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sions and academic articles22 and extensively discussed the jurisprudential underpinnings of the common law of Aboriginal rights.
There are several possible reasons for the absence of reference to jurisprudence from both inside and outside Canada. To begin, it may reflect the extent to which Powley represents a first exploration of what is
truly legal terra incognito, and also perhaps the Court’s admonishment
that “[a]lthough s. 35 protects ‘existing’ rights, it is more than a mere
codification of the common law. Section 35 reflects a new promise: a
constitutional commitment to protecting practices that were historically
important features of particular aboriginal communities”.23 It may also
reflect a desire to provide a concise, plainly written decision that is more
accessible to the general public. Finally, the Court may have thought
that the jurisprudence had already been fleshed out in First Nations
cases, although this does not explain the limited discussion of the rationale for the effective control approach.

IV. AREAS RIPE FOR FUTURE LITIGATION
Although the Powley decision raises a considerable number of issues
that may ultimately be litigated, this article proposes to focus on two;
namely, the identification of historic rights bearing Métis communities
and the verification of individual membership in a Métis community. This
is because these two issues raise practical and evidentiary concerns that
both governments and the Métis are grappling with at present and that
must be resolved quickly in order to avoid extensive litigation.
1. The Meaning of Community
The existence of distinctive historic Métis communities forms the core
of the constitutional protection afforded Métis rights under section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained:
The inclusion of the Métis in s. 35 is based on a commitment to
recognizing the Métis and enhancing their survival as distinctive
communities. The purpose and the promise of s. 35 is to protect practices
22

In Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, Lamer C.J. referred to 26
decisions and 35 authors of academic articles.
23
Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 45, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.
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that were historically important features of these distinctive communities
and that persist in the present day as integral elements of their Métis
culture.24 [Emphasis added.]

Although the Court in Powley acknowledged that different groups
of Métis exhibit their own distinctive traits and traditions and may therefore be referred to as “peoples”, it found that “it is only necessary for
our purposes to verify that the claimants belong to an identifiable Métis
community with a sufficient degree of continuity and stability to support
a site-specific aboriginal right”.25 In other words, although there may be
larger Métis peoples, in order to determine section 35 Métis Aboriginal
rights, one must look for a site-specific historic Métis community.
This conclusion remains the subject of debate. Some Métis groups
appear to prefer to dispense with the site-specific community requirement and instead, would have Métis dealt with on the basis that they
belong to a people who live generally within a larger territory, e.g., the
Great Lakes environs. The fact that Métis may exist as broader territorial peoples is certainly relevant to the section 35 analysis but is not
likely a sufficient or necessary basis upon which to dispense with the
requirement for historic site-specific Métis communities. The wider
concept of “peoples” may be relevant to determining the characteristics
of a particular community. Thus, for example, the Michif language as a
trait of a site specific community may not have to be proved based on
specific evidence of each community where the evidence is clear that a
community belonged to a wider people or “nation” that spoke Michif.
Such an approach would seem to be especially warranted where it appears that the shortfall in community specific evidence can be attributed
to a particular deficiency in the historical record such as the destruction
of relevant fur trade post records. More generally, the close connection
between the concepts of distinct “peoples” and distinct ethnic “communities” suggest that the factors used to identify the existence of distinct
“peoples” also are likely to be of some value in identifying distinct
communities. Nevertheless, the fact that one can draw inferences about
a community based on traits of the peoples more generally is not a basis
upon which to suggest that all communities within a broader territory
are the same or must hold identical rights. To find otherwise would
24
25

Id., at para. 13.
Id., at para. 12.
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certainly deviate from the approach to the definition of community
previously adopted by the Courts in the First Nations’ rights context.
Notwithstanding the central importance it placed on specific historic
Métis communities, the Supreme Court in Powley provided only very
general guidance as to what is required to demonstrate the existence of a
distinctive historic Métis community. It noted that “‘Métis’…refers to
distinctive peoples who, in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed
their own customs, way of life, and recognizable group identity separate
from their Indian or Inuit and European forebears”.26 It further explained
that there must be a “distinctive collective identity, shared geographic
location and common way of life”.27
In order to more fully develop the criteria that demonstrate the existence of historic Métis communities, it is necessary to draw upon other
sources. The decisions of the lower courts and the record in Powley are
an obvious starting point. For example, the Court of Appeal noted that a
community cannot be a political organization:
Neither OMAA nor the MNO constitute the sort of discrete, historic and
site-specific community contemplated by Van der Peet capable of holding
a constitutionally protected aboriginal right.28

The Court of Appeal further described what the historic Métis
community at Sault Ste. Marie looked like. It noted that the majority of
inhabitants were of mixed ancestry and that the community was a “hub
of early fur trade activity”.29 As well, the Métis occupied a distinctive
niche in the fur trade economy as wage earners, skilled tradesmen and
farmers. They were more sedentary than the local Ojibway, and most
important, they had a distinct culture with separate community structures, mode of dress, musical traditions and language.30
The Superior Court in Powley looked to Black’s Law Dictionary,31
for a definition of “community” in dealing with the issue of whether
there is a present day Métis community:

26
27
28
29
30
31

Id., at para. 10.
Id., at para. 12.
(2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 35, at para. 144, [2001] O.J. No. 607 (C.A.).
Id., at para. 18.
Id., at paras. 18-20.
6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990).
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Neighborhood; vicinity; synonymous with locality. . . . People who reside
in a locality in more or less proximity. A society or body of people living
in the same place, under the same laws and regulations, who have
common rights, privileges, or interests. . . . It connotes a congeries of
common interests arising from associations — social, business, religious,
governmental, scholastic, recreational.32 [Emphasis added.]

In spite of this definition, which begins with a physical site-specific
proximity, the Superior Court focused ultimately on evidence of kinship.
The court relied heavily on the evidence of defence “community witnesses” that spoke about shared family roots. In addition, these witnesses
discussed shared economic and cultural activities. By way of example,
one witness is quoted in the decision as being part of a community that
was centred on music, picnics with berry picking and hunting.33
Finally, the trial judge emphasized cultural attributes, noting that the
customs, practices and traditions of the Métis were distinctive and separate from the Ojibway. The court remarked that the Métis were “visually, culturally and ethnically distinct”.34 This point is well illustrated by
the evidence of an expert cited by the court:
These people [referring to the Métis] were neither adjunct relative-members of
tribal villages nor the standard bearers of European civilization in the
wilderness. Increasingly, they stood apart or, more precisely, in between. By
the end of the last struggle for empire in 1815, their towns which were
visually, ethnically and culturally distinct from neighbouring Indian villages
and “white towns” along the eastern seaboard, stretched from Detroit and
Michilimakinae at the east to the Red River at the northwest. ... such towns
grew as a result of and were increasingly dominated by the offspring of
Canadian trade employees and Indian women who, having reached their
majority, were intermarrying among themselves and rearing successive
generations of Métis these communities did not represent an extension of
French, and later British colonial culture, but rather “adaption[s] to the Upper
Great Lakes environment”.35 [Emphasis added.]

In addition to the decisions and the record in Powley, there are a variety of other sources to look to for help in defining the concept of
32

(2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 30, at para. 53, [2000] O.J. No. 99 (S.C.J.).
Id., at para. 34.
Powley, [1998] O.J. No. 5310, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153, at paras. 75-76 (Prov. Div.).
35
Exhibit #31, Dr. Ray’s Supporting Documents, vol. 3, Tab 7, Many Roads to Red
River by Jacqueline Peterson, at 41, cited in Powley, reasons at trial, id., at para. 76.
33
34
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community. The decisions dealing with Métis rights from the western
provinces have shed little light thus far on the issue of what identifies a
historic Métis community.36 This reflects the fact that in most of these
cases, the primary issue has been whether the individual qualifies as an
“Indian” for the purposes of one of the Natural Resources Transfer
Agreements (“NRTA”) of 1930, and the Métis identity of the defendant
has been conceded by the Crown.37 The notable exceptions are Morin
and the trial decision in Blais.38
36
R. v. Budd, [1979] 6 W.W.R. 45; R. v. Ferguson, [1993] 2 C.N.L.R. 148, [1993] A.J.
No. 190 (Prov. Ct.), affd [1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 117, [1993] A.J. No. 1064 (Q.B.); R. v. McPherson (1994), 90 Man. R. (2d) 290, [1994] M.J. No. 750 (Q.B.); R. v. Desjarlais [1996] 1
C.N.L.R. 148, [1995] A.J. No. 1324 (Prov. Ct.), distinguished [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 113, [1995]
A.J. No. 1320 (Q.B.); R. v. Grumbo, [1996] 10 W.W.R. 170, [1996] S.J. No. 504 (Q.B.), revd
[1999] 1 W.W.R. 9, [1998] S.J. No. 331 (C.A.); R. v. Blais, [1997] 3 C.N.L.R. 109, [1996]
M.J. No. 391 (Prov. Ct.), affd (1998) 130 Man. R. (2d) 114, [1998] M.J. No. 395 (Q.B.), affd
(2001) 156 Man. R. (2d) 53 (C.A.), affd 2003 SCC 44, [2001] M.J. No. 168 [hereinafter
“Blais”]; and R. v. Howse, [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 228, [2000] B.C.J. No. 905 (P.C.), revd 2002
BCSC 235, [2002] B.C.J. No. 379 (S.C.), leave to appeal granted 2003 BCCA 152, [2003]
B.C.J. No. 508 (S.C) [hereinafter “Howse”].
37
These cases generally confirm the importance of a shared mode of life, including cultural and economic practices and activities. By way of example, in R. v. Desjarlais, id., the
Court of Queen’s Bench looked to ancestry and to an “Indian mode of life” in addressing the
question of whether the defendants were Indians within the protection of the NRTA:

While the Ferguson Court did not attempt to establish an exhaustive list of factors
which constitute following an Indian mode of life, the Crown submitted that the
Court in Ferguson established certain necessary elements. There must be a connection with the Indian language; there must be a connection with an Indian community; there must be self-identification by the individual in question as an Indian;
there must be a connection with traditional Indian food gathering techniques such as
hunting and trapping and fishing; there must be a connection with traditional Indian
customs, on religion, philosophy and lifestyle. Ferguson does not determine the exact nature of such connections.[Emphasis added.]
This analysis is directed to determining the standing of an individual rather than a group or
class of people. However, it is probative of the issue of community identification because communities of course are based on ties between individuals, and the connections that serve to identify a
person as a member of an Aboriginal community therefore are very closely intertwined with the
connections that serve to demarcate the existence of a community. In this particular case, the
connections looked to by the court are broadly similar to those that can be gleaned from the Powley
decisions and other sources, e.g., shared cultural and harvesting practices as manifested through
constituent elements such as harvesting activities, shared customs and religious traditions.
38
In Howse, the issue was disposed of on appeal primarily on the basis of an absence of
evidence of an Aboriginal right. In Dumont v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No.
17 [hereinafter “Dumont”]. The Manitoba Métis Federation has sought a “declaration that the
federal...statutes and orders-in-council...were unconstitutional measures that had the purpose
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In Morin, the trial judge found that the Métis “people of Turnor
Lake are currently living as a community and basically off the land as
they have since the early 1800’s”.39 In reaching this conclusion, he remarked that the Métis sprang from the fur trade and their geographic
territory was marked by fur trading posts.40 In Blais, the trial judge simply concluded that Métis in the Red River Settlement were an organized
society.41 However, he also appended to his decision a lengthy summary
of the evidence tendered at trial, including the report of an expert dealing with “Origins or Ethnogenesis of the Métis” which, once again, tied
the Métis communities to fur trading posts and activity.
Five Métis Aboriginal rights cases have been addressed by courts in
New Brunswick in the last three years.42 In all four cases, the New
Brunswick courts have rejected assertions of Métis rights at least in part
on the basis that the claimants have not established that there was a
historic Métis community. However, these findings for the most part
have rested on a generalized consideration of the basic inadequacy of
the evidence tendered on behalf of the claimants rather than a specific
assessment of what factors inform the determination of whether a historic Métis community existed.43 The evidence led by the claimants
generally has taken the form of unsupported and vague assertions by lay
witnesses. As a result, these cases generally shed little light on what
factors might serve to identify a historic Métis community.
Although the case law is not advanced on the issue of community
definition, Professor Bell has thoroughly addressed the issue in “Who
and effect of stripping the Métis of the land base promised to them under Sections 31 and 32
of the Manitoba Act, 1870”. The earlier proceedings in the case dealt primarily with a preliminary motion to strike the claim. In dealing with this motion on appeal, O’Sullivan J.A (in
dissent) remarked that the Métis possessed a sufficient self-awareness of their existence as a
people to maintain law and order through a provisional government.
39
Morin, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 157, at 167, [1996] S.J. No. 262 (Prov. Ct.).
40
Morin, id., at 166.
41
Blais, supra, note 36, at 133 (Man. Prov. Ct.).
42
R. v. Chiasson, 2001 NBPC 5, [2001] N.B.J. No. 87 (affd by N.B.Q.B. no reported
reasons); R. v. Castonguay, 2002 NBPC 1, [2002] N.B.J. No. 447 (Prov. Ct.), 2003 NBQB
325, [2003] N.B.J. No. 350 (Q.B.); R. v. Castonguay, 2002 NBPC 26, [2002] N.B.J. No. 362
(Prov. Ct.) (hereinafter “Castonguay No. 2”); and R. v. Daigle, 2003 NBPC 4, [2003] N.B.J.
No. 65 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Hopper, [2004] N.B.J. No. 107 (Prov. Ct.).
43
Chiasson, id., at paras. 20, 29; Castonguay, id., at paras. 36-51, 55 (espec. para. 51)
(Prov. Ct.) and at para. 16 (N.B.Q.B.), Castonguay No. 2, id., at paras. 55, 61-65; and Daigle,
id., at paras. 30-38; Hopper, id., at paras. 10 and 21.
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are the Métis People in Section 35 (2)?”.44 At the risk of oversimplification, her analysis is primarily directed to identifying and evaluating
competing definitions of Métis,45 and concludes by recommending that
Métis be defined as the descendants of the historic Métis Nation centred
on the Red River Settlement or people associated with ongoing Métis
[mixed ancestry] collectives. The Supreme Court of Canada appears to
have broadly agreed and accepted that Métis peoples may extend beyond the Red River group.46 Professor Bell also sets out general criteria
for “peoples” that are helpful for identifying specific communities.47
These include common history, ethnicity, culture, language, religion,
ideology and economic base. In addition, she suggests that a sufficient
number of people may be required, although what that number is cannot
be pre-determined.
Finally, the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(“RCAP Report”) appears to be exerting a strong influence on the
courts, especially in respect to Métis cases.48 Its relevance on the specific issue of identifying historic Métis communities would seem to be
three-fold. First, it specifically identifies a number of historic Métis
communities including Sault Ste. Marie, Rainy River and Moose Fac-

44

(1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 351.
Id., at 374. Professor Bell lists the following definitions as some of the broad choices
for defining the term Métis:
45

1. Anyone of mixed Indian/non-Indian blood who is not a status Indian;
2. A person who identifies as Métis and is accepted by a successor community of the
Métis Nation;
3. A person who identifies as Métis and is accepted by a self-identifying Métis community;
4. Persons who took, or were entitled to take, half-breed grants under the Manitoba Act
or Dominion Lands Act, and their descendants; and
5. Descendants of persons excluded from the Indian Act regime by virtue of a way of
life criterion.
46
Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at paras. 11-12, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.
47
Supra, note 44, at 364.
48
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples [hereinafter “RCAP Report”]. See the reasons at trial in Powley, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153, at para. 77, [1998] O.J. No. 5310, the reasons
of the Superior Court (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 30, at paras. 44, 58, and 63, [2000] O.J. No. 99,
the reasons of the Court of Appeal (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 35, at paras. 101-102, 132, 134-35
and 151, [2001] O.J. No. 607; and the reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada at, 2003 SCC
43, at para. 10, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.

(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d)

R. v. Powley

259

tory.49 Second, the RCAP Report recounts the historical origins of a
Métis identity as largely being communities that developed over time
adjacent to fur trading posts and ultimately, converging at the forks of
the Red and Assiniboine rivers.50 Third, the RCAP Report specifically
addresses the criteria that should be used to identify who qualifies as a
“people” under section 35. It does so by citing the criteria used by the
International Commission of Jurists (and referred to in the Bell article)
above and stressing the importance of the subjective characteristic of “a
sense of community”.51
In conclusion, a number of elements relevant to identifying historic
Métis communities at a general or conceptual level appear repeatedly in
sources discussed above. Of these, the most crucial (as a matter of frequency and the importance attached to them) seem to be:
(1) population of mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry;
(2) culture based on Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal sources;
(3) social ties, especially kinship ties involving intermarriage among
families of mixed ancestry;
(4) economic ties, typically involving a distinct economic niche incorporating both Aboriginal and European activities and practices;
(5) site specific physical presence; and
(6) manifestation of some sense of self-awareness as a distinct community that is neither Indian nor European.
As applied to the Sault Ste. Marie Métis, the community in 1850
had many of the above characteristics. In particular, the culture was
marked by musical tradition of voyageur songs, distinct Métis fiddling
and dances. There was a distinct mode of dress that included wearing
the sash, the capote and a general mixture of European and Indian
clothes. The inhabitants would likely have spoken some Michif as well
as native and European languages, and would have followed the Roman
Catholic faith. They typically lived in timber homes on long, narrow lots
fronting on the river. They had kinship connections among core families
49
50
51

RCAP Report, id., at vol. 4, at 259-60.
RCAP Report, id., at vol. 2, at 150.
RCAP Report, id., at vol. 4, at 298.
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and practised endogamous marriage patterns. Most important, the community shared an occupational interest in the fur trade.
2. Individual Membership in the Modern Métis Community
(a) The Legal Test
Once a historic and contemporary Métis community has been found,
the person claiming a Métis Aboriginal right is required to establish that
he or she is entitled to exercise the Métis community’s Aboriginal
rights. Because Canadian courts thus far have been called upon to address Aboriginal rights claims typically involving persons recognized as
Indians under the Indian Act or as members of statutorily recognized
bands, they have not been required to seriously consider individual
entitlement.
In contrast, because there is no formal structure such as a band for
most Métis or a unanimously adopted definition of who is Métis, the
Court in Powley has developed a common law legal test for identifying
Métis Aboriginal rights holders. The criteria for demonstrating membership in a community at common law are self-identification, ancestral
connection and community acceptance.
Turning to the first requirement, the Supreme Court cautioned that
“self-identification should not be of recent vintage: While an individual’s self-identification need not be static or monolithic, claims that are
made belatedly in order to benefit from a s. 35 right will not satisfy the
self-identification requirement”.52 By stressing that self-identification
must be longstanding, the Court sought to avert opportunistic identification as Métis by individuals of mixed ancestry who have tenuous connections to Métis communities.
The criterion of an ancestral connection is perhaps the most controversial and the Court was careful not to cast its contours in stone. Instead, it highlighted that the purpose of the ancestral connection of the
claimant to the historic community was to ensure that there was a “real
link”. It further noted that while it would not require a minimum “blood
quantum”, it would “require some proof that the claimant’s ancestors

52

Powley, supra, note 48, at para. 31 (S.C.C.).
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belonged to the historic Métis community by birth, adoption, or other
means”.53
What the phrase “other means” encompasses is perhaps deliberately
left open by the Court. Reading it in the context of the earlier requirements, however, would suggest a fairly narrow extension beyond hereditary connection. The Court was concerned about perceived arbitrary
blood quantum cut-offs as has been alleged is created by the Indian Act
for the definition of Indian. This, however, does not mean that a person
can claim an ancestral connection simply by virtue of living with and
among a Métis community. If the Court had intended to permit membership through merely self-identification or acceptance, it would not have
included the requirement of an ancestral connection.
As to the criterion of community acceptance, the Court was clear
that membership in a Métis political organization may be relevant to but
is not determinative of the question of community acceptance. Further,
the relevance of membership in a political organization is dependent on
a contextual understanding of the membership requirements of the organization and its role in the Métis community. The Court concluded:
The range of acceptable forms of evidence does not attenuate the need for
an objective demonstration of a solid bond of past and present mutual
identification and recognition of common belonging between the claimant
and other members of the rights-bearing community.54 [Emphasis added.]

While setting out a fairly straightforward legal test for individual
membership in a community, the Court was quick to realize that this
was an area ripe for negotiations. It appreciated that the question of who
is a Métis has both legal and political dimensions and that, ultimately,
“[i]n the longer term, a combination of negotiation and judicial settlement will more clearly define the contours of the Métis right to
hunt…”.55 Until negotiations resolve outstanding identity issues, they
will fall by default to the courts to decide. This was explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada which noted that “[i]n the mean-

53

Powley, id., at para. 32.
Powley, id., at para. 33.
Id., at paras. 30 and 50. In addition to negotiating identity issues, the parties may also
have to deal with a host of other issues including priority rankings between Aboriginal peoples and communities.
54
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time, courts faced with Métis claims will have to ascertain Métis identity on a case-by-case basis”.56
(b) Practical Evidentiary Considerations
The test for membership in a community raises serious evidentiary
concerns. For example, when endeavouring to demonstrate selfidentification, the claimant must show that it is not “made belatedly”.57
The requisite evidence must come from either the claimant or witnesses
who know the claimant. Because of the acutely personal, subjective and
sensitive nature of how one self-identifies or feels about being part of a
community, the best evidence is clearly from the claimant. Yet this may
pose a problem in a prosecution where the accused may choose not to
testify for reasons separate from the Aboriginal claim. In Powley, the
lower courts expressed some unease with the absence of testimony from
the claimants. At trial, Vaillancourt J. remarked:
…oral evidence by the Powleys would have allowed the court a better
opportunity to assess how the Powleys interact within the Métis
community of the Sault Ste Marie area.
Although I agree with Mr. Long that this oversight is a very significant
omission, it is not in itself fatal to the overall position taken by the
Powleys.58 [Emphasis added.]

Sharpe J.A. at the Court of Appeal also commented on this issue:
While I recognize that an accused person has the right not to testify and
that the decision to call or not to call an accused will often involve
difficult tactical considerations for counsel, where a defense is based on
the assertion of an aboriginal right, it remains an essential element of the
defense to establish the claimant of the right is a member of the aboriginal
community. ….. it might have been preferable to have direct evidence

56
57
58

63.

Id., at para. 29.
Id., at para. 31.
Powley, reasons at trial, [1998] O.J. No. 5310, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153, at paras. 62-
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from the respondents as to their membership in and acceptance by the
local Métis community…59. [Emphasis added.]

In spite of this unease, however, both judges found that the Powley’s did self-identify as Métis. This was based largely on the fact that
they wrote their membership number in a Métis organization on a slip of
paper attached to their moose before they were charged. This suggests
that, at the end of the day, the threshold for demonstrating selfidentification may be low.
Demonstrating community acceptance could pose similar difficulties where the political and legal institutions of the community itself are
not well developed. The various courts in Powley, however, as with selfidentification, have not set a very high threshold. While membership in
an organization alone will not suffice, participation in some cultural and
social activities among a group of families in the area who can also trace
their ancestry to a recognized community, has sufficed to meet the
community acceptance test.
In consequence, the ancestral connection will likely be critical to the
disposition of a claim. In this regard, the trial judge remarked that the
“current practice of individuals financing independent ancestral searches
is both cumbersome and expensive”.60 Nevertheless, in Powley, the
availability of fairly extensive documentation (such as Hudson’s Bay
Company records, treaty pay lists, various official reports and census
records), the relatively small number of families that likely form the
genealogical baseline for the Métis community and the probability that
many Métis claimants will be closely related suggest that considerable
progress in tracing ancestral connections can be made at a reasonable
cost through a co-ordinated effort.
In Ontario, at least one Métis organization states that it is assembling genealogical evidence in an effort to identify Métis who may hold
harvesting rights. The Métis Nation of Ontario (“MNO”) issues “Harvesters Certificates” to members61 that demonstrate that “he or she is

59

Powley, reasons of the Court of Appeal, (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 35, at paras. 143, 149,
[2001] O.J. No. 607.
60
Powley, supra, note 58, at para. 38.
61
According to the MNO’s website at <http://www.metisnation.org/insideMNO/
registry.html>, the MNO presently applies the following definition of Métis in determining
membership in the MNO:
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ordinarily resident and intends to participate in the Métis harvest in his
or her traditional territory which is within the Province of Ontario or
that a direct ancestor was a beneficiary of an Ontario treaty and that he
or she is ordinarily resident and intends to participate in the Métis harvest in that treaty area”.62 According to the MNO, Harvesters Certificate
“shall be considered proof that the holder has been verified by the MNO
Registrar as having provided sufficient documentation to support a
claim to an Aboriginal or treaty right to harvest”.63
1.1 “Métis” means a person who self-identifies as Métis, is distinct from other
Aboriginal peoples, is of Historic Métis Nation ancestry, and is accepted by the Métis Nation.
Defined Terms in National Definition of Métis
1.2 “Historic Métis Nation” means the Aboriginal people then known as Métis
or Half-breeds who resided in the Historic Métis Nation Homeland.
1.3 “Historic Métis Nation Homeland” means the area of land in west central
North America used and occupied as the traditional territory of the Métis or Halfbreeds as they were then known.
1.4 “Métis Nation” means the Aboriginal people descended from the Historic
Métis Nation which is now comprised of all Métis Nation citizens and is one of the
“aboriginal peoples of Canada” within the meaning of s.35 of the Constitution Act
1982.
1.5 “Distinct from other Aboriginal peoples” means distinct for cultural and nationhood purposes.
This definition was adopted by the Métis National Council (of which the MNO is a
member) on September 27-28, 2002.
Previously, acceptance by the MNO was dependent upon the following criteria:
2.2 Citizenship in the MNO shall be limited to individuals interested in furthering the objects of the MNO and who are Métis within the definition adopted by the
MNO in accordance with the Métis National Council which is as follows1:
a) Anyone of Aboriginal ancestry who self-identifies as Métis as distinct from
Indian or Inuit; has at least one grandparent who is Aboriginal; and whose application for admission as a citizen is accepted by the MNO.
2.3 A person is entitled to be registered as a citizen of MNO who:
a) Provides sufficient documentation that he or she is Métis within the meaning
of 2.2(a);
b) is not enrolled on any other Aboriginal registry; and
c) whose application for admission as a citizen has been approved through the
registry process of the MNO as amended from time to time
62
See online, <http://www.metisnation.org/harvesting/Policy/home.html> and Article 4.4 of the Métis Nation of Ontario 2001 Harvesting Policy online, at
<http://www.metisnation.org/harvesting/Policy/harvest_policy.html>.
63
Article 4.5 of the Métis Nation of Ontario 2001 Harvesting Policy at
<http://www.metisnation.org/harvesting/Policy/harvest_policy.html>.
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The other large province-wide Métis organization in Ontario, the
Ontario Métis Aboriginal Association (“OMAA”) appears to only require its members to attest to the identity and treaty area of ancestors
who were members of an Indian band64 and issues “Certificates of Aboriginal Status” which OMAA advises can “be used for identification
purposes including, but not limited to… harvesting (hunting, fishing,
trapping, gathering”).65 Demonstrating that a person can attest to the
identity and treaty areas of ancestors who were members of Indian
bands self-evidently is not the same as proving “that the claimant’s
ancestors belonged to the historic Métis community by birth, adoption,
or other means”.66
The final practical concern with identification of Métis rights holders is a potential difficulty in distinguishing Métis Aboriginal rights
holders from other rights holders. This concern has been raised by Professor Slatterly, who suggests that because many Aboriginal people are
of mixed-Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry and belong to communities whose distinct cultures originate in both Aboriginal and nonAboriginal influences, it is difficult to distinguish the individuals and
communities that are Métis as defined in Powley.67 In Powley itself, the
historical record demonstrated that a “significant number of [Sault Ste.
Marie Métis] families joined the local Ojibway bands on the near by
Batchewana and Garden River reserves. By 1890, 191 of 285 Batchewana band members were Métis, as were 199 of 412 Garden River band
members”.68 Descendants of the historic Métis of Sault Ste. Marie continue to enjoy membership in the Batchewana and Garden River
bands.69 The Powleys’ own ancestors were recognized as band members
64

Ontario Métis Aboriginal Association application form, undated.
See online, <http://www.omaa.org/page_11_Join_or_renew_membership.htm>.
Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 32, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43.
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At the Pacific Law and Business Foundation’s conference entitled “The Supreme
Court of Canada Recognizes Métis Rights”, held in Toronto on November 20-21, 2003.
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Powley, reasons of the Court of Appeal (2001), O.R. (3d) 35, at para. 23, [2001] O.J.
No. 607.
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As of 1999, band councillors for the Batchewana band included Adelene Corbière,
Joe Sayers, Noel and Holly Syrette and Chief Vernon Syrette. The band council for the
Garden River band in 1999 included Blaine and Terry Belleau, L.M. and Doreen Lesage,
Terry and Darrell Boissoneau, Stuart Soulière and Chief Lyle Sayers. All these surnames are
closely associated with historic Sault Ste. Marie Métis families identified in the 1861 census
and listed on the Batchewana and Garden River treaty paylists beginning between 1857 and
1874.
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from the 1850s until 1918.70 In sum, there can be little doubt that many
Indians in the Sault Ste. Marie area possess a mixed ancestry heritage
and strong connections to the historic Sault Ste. Marie Métis community.
Similarly, in “The Promise of Marshall on the Prairies: A Framework for Analyzing Unfulfilled Treaty Promises, Professor Bell and
Karin Buss remark:
By 1899, many Aboriginal people in Treaty 8 territory were of mixed
Indian and European ancestory, making it difficult to distinguish
“Indians” from "Métis". Many people who entered into treaty, as well as
those receiving scrip, had mixed Indian and European ancestry and
included some people believed by officials to be Indians. In certain
instances, some members of the same family took scrip while others took
treaty benefits.71

Some of the potential problems in distinguishing Métis and Indians
in addressing section 35 rights perhaps can be minimized by ensuring
that due weight is placed on the importance of self-identification as
Métis. By way of example, in Sault Ste. Marie itself, there are those that
self-identify as Métis and those who self-identify as band members.
Applied to individuals of mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry, the Powley test permits persons of mixed ancestry to either emphasize their Métis or Indian heritage and to claim rights in line with that
self-identification.
It can be argued that such an approach eschews objectivity in that it
allows individuals whose most immediate and substantial Aboriginal
connections extend to First Nations rather than distinct Métis communities to nonetheless assert rights as Métis because they happen to have a
remote ancestral connection to a distinct historic Métis community and
prefer, for whatever reasons, to emphasize and rely on this connection.
However, as long as individuals are not permitted to pick and choose
their identity simply as it suits them at any given time, there does not
appear to be any obvious practical defect with such an approach. Moreover, as a matter of principle, it may be more consistent with the traditional perspective of many Aboriginal peoples as reflected in the
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historical fluidity of Aboriginal identity. Doubtlessly historical circumstances will be raised that pose challenges for distinguishing between
Métis and Indian communities, rights and rights holders, but the selfidentification criterion may go a considerable distance in unravelling
this knot.

V. CONCLUSION
The Powley case provides a firm foundation upon which to build a
Métis section 35 Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. It is fundamentally
based on the First Nation Aboriginal rights model but with some variation and one critical change. The “pre-contact” requirement for the establishment of the community is now a “pre-control” requirement.
Although the jurisprudential underpinnings for this approach are not
dealt with in any detail by the Court, the concept of pre-control provides
sufficient clarity to ensure that Métis communities enjoy broad but not
open-ended constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights. As well, courts
will be required to more strenuously review claims of community membership given the absence of legally recognized communities in parts of
the country. No doubt further litigation will ensue to flesh out those
areas left open by the Court such as the extent to which ancestral connections may be departed from in determining membership. As well,
courts will have to grapple with the impact of Powley on other Aboriginal groups. Consultations, negotiations and non-judicial processes will
also impact on the ultimate shape of Métis Aboriginal rights. The Powley decision therefore should be regarded as providing a sound first step
in the ongoing process of defining and refining Métis Aboriginal rights.

